Unpacking IAEA’s anti-Iran resolution, political motives, fallout and the road ahead

By Ivan Kesic

The politically motivated resolution passed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors in Vienna early on Thursday underscores the UN nuclear watchdog’s longstanding bias against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The resolution, pushed by the European troika and backed by the United States, has already prompted strong condemnations from Iran and led to announcements of a new nuclear facility and upgradation of centrifuges to an advanced level at the Fordow nuclear plant.

It marks the first time in nearly two decades that the UN agency has formally accused Iran of allegedly breaching its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

With 19 votes in favor, 3 against (Russia, China, and Burkina Faso), 11 abstentions, and 1 member not voting, the resolution claimed that Iran was “non-compliant with its safeguards obligations,” in a clearly political move.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), and many high-ranking officials swiftly condemned the resolution, warning that it will not go unanswered.

Ironically, it came just three days before the sixth round of indirect nuclear talks between Tehran and Washington in Muscat, with the atmosphere already tainted by the war-mongering rhetoric of top American officials, including President Donald Trump.

Is the IAEA impartial toward Iran?

Over the years, the Vienna-headquartered UN nuclear agency has repeatedly leveled politically motivated accusations against Iran’s peaceful nuclear program, despite its own reports almost always confirming the peaceful nature of the country’s activities.

On Tuesday, in response to IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi’s announcement of a new resolution mirroring past claims, Mohammad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), criticized his remarks as lacking both technical and legal validity, calling them deeply politicized.

He asserted that the IAEA chief’s statements were shaped entirely by “the psychological and political operations that the Zionist regime [of Israel] has been conducting” against the Islamic Republic.

Eslami noted that Grossi’s comments revealed “his true character,” showing him to be aligned with those who have long engaged in psychological warfare against Iran.

Russian envoy to the IAEA, Mikhail Ulyanov, also slammed the Western countries who pushed the resolution before it was put to a vote, calling it “very bad and unfair.” 

“Western countries claim that Iran should return to full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). At the same time, they demonstrate no intention to comply with the JCPOA in terms of sanctions lifting,” he said. Ulyanov added that there is “nothing new” in the resolution.

What was Iran’s response after the resolution?

Iran’s Foreign Ministry  and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) issued a joint statement on Thursday in response to the anti-Iran resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors, condemning it as “lacking any technical and legal basis” and “yet another instrumental use of the governing board based on political motives.”

They reiterated Iran’s full compliance with its safeguard commitments, emphasizing that none of the IAEA reports to date have indicated the Islamic Republic’s non-compliance or any deviation in its nuclear activities.

The joint statement criticized the IAEA’s “political and biased” report, stating that the US and the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) went even further by drafting a resolution whose main content contradicts the politically motivated report by the IAEA director general.

It added that the four Western countries are pursuing their own political agendas and have attempted to revive unfounded claims dating back over 25 years, after failing to identify any ambiguities in Iran’s current nuclear activities.

“This comes even though all such past claims were officially closed under the IAEA’s November 2015 resolution,” the joint statement noted.

The statement also criticized the four countries for their silence in the face of the Israeli regime’s refusal to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its clandestine program for developing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.

It further noted that no action has been taken in response to the Israeli regime’s threats to attack the peaceful nuclear facilities of NPT member states, including Iran.

“Moreover, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France have failed to fulfill their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT, while Germany continues to host these deadly and inhumane weapons,” the statement continued.

The statement emphasized that the Western countries’ efforts to pass a resolution against Iran have “seriously undermined the credibility and reputation” of the UN nuclear agency and further revealed the political nature of this international body.

“This politicized approach toward a country that has consistently honored its commitments and cooperated extensively with the Agency only leads us to conclude that the policy of engagement and cooperation yields adverse results,” it added.

“As we have previously stated, the Islamic Republic of Iran has no choice but to respond to this political resolution,” the joint statement concluded, adding that “Iran is devising alternative plans, which will be announced in due course.”

Iran’s nuclear chief Eslami, speaking to the state broadcaster IRIB, said the “anti-Iran” resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors was intended to pressure Tehran into making concessions.

“What we observe today is a series of political moves by the three European countries, Britain, France and Germany, guided by the United States and aided by the IAEA Director General [Rafael Grossi], who is under the influence of the Zionist regime. Their goal is to pressure us into giving concessions,” Eslami stressed.

He also warned that the IAEA’s capacities are being misused, referring to a report by Reuters published after the vote, which claimed that Iran had allegedly failed to fulfill its nuclear commitments to the UN nuclear watchdog.

The spokesman and deputy head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Behrouz Kamalvandi also condemned the resolution, warning that the level of cooperation with the UN nuclear agency is “under review.”

“Among the 32 countries that have safeguards agreements with the IAEA, Iran alone accounts for 72 percent of inspections. Overall, 22 percent of the Agency’s inspections worldwide are carried out in our country,” he noted.

What were Iran’s previous warnings to the E3 and US?

Ahead of the Vienna meeting, Iranian officials had warned that any politically motivated move against the country could jeopardize its cooperation with the UN nuclear agency.

On Tuesday, Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said that Tehran’s response options to the resolution have been prepared in coordination with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).

Baghaei criticized a previous report by the IAEA Director General on Iran’s nuclear program, which claimed Iran had failed to report its nuclear activities and raised concerns about its stockpile of enriched uranium, as “devoid of legality” and “politically motivated.”

Addressing the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on Wednesday, Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, Reza Najafi, stated that the E3 countries have failed to abide by their JCPOA commitments to lift anti-Iran sanctions and are in no legal or moral position to make further hostile moves.

He cited the E3’s refusal to honor their obligation to remove sanctions that should’ve been lifted on the JCPOA’s Transition Day in October 2023, as well as their imposition of additional restrictions on Iran in clear violation of the JCPOA and UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorses the deal.

Najafi warned that any action by the E3 or the US against UNSC Resolution 2231, or any new sanctions imposed on Iran by the Council, would have serious consequences. “Under such a scenario, Iran’s options will be decisive, as previously told to other JCPOA parties, and the US and the E3 countries will bear all the responsibility,” he said.

Also on Wednesday, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi issued a stern warning to the E3 signatories of the 2015 nuclear deal, accusing them of failing to fulfill their obligations and cautioning against further “strategic mistakes.”

In a post on X, Araghchi criticized the E3’s record in implementing the JCPOA: “The E3 have had SEVEN YEARS to implement their JCPOA commitments. They have utterly failed, either by design or ineptitude.”

The top diplomat condemned recent actions by the European trio as provocative and counterproductive to diplomacy: “Instead of displaying remorse or a desire to facilitate diplomacy, the E3 is today promoting confrontation through the absurd demand that Iran must be punished for exercising its right under the JCPOA to respond to non-performance by counterparts.”

“As I have warned, another major strategic mistake by the E3 will compel Iran to react STRONGLY. Blame will lie solely and FULLY with malign actors who shatter their own relevance,” he wrote.

Many view the anti-Iran resolution as a potential trigger for activating the snapback mechanism, which could reinstate UN sanctions against Iran. However, officials warn that, in such a case, Iran might consider abandoning the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) itself.

On Wednesday, Iran’s ambassador to the UN, Amir Saeid Iravani, reiterated the Islamic Republic’s earlier warnings, saying it would consider a proportionate response, “including by starting the process of withdrawal from the NPT per Article X of the Treaty.”

What are the practical steps for Iran after the resolution?

Immediately following the resolution, Kamalvandi announced on state television that Iran will establish a third underground uranium enrichment facility — alongside Fordow and Natanz — and will upgrade centrifuges at Fordow.

He described these as “specific and effective” measures. While no precise location was revealed, the statement suggests possible tunnel expansions near Fordow and Natanz.

Kamalvandi emphasized Iran’s extensive and unmatched cooperation with the IAEA, warning that this level of engagement is now being reconsidered.

A joint statement issued by the Foreign Ministry and the AEOI announced that necessary orders had been given to launch a new enrichment facility at a secure location.

They also revealed that instructions have been issued to replace the first-generation IR-1 centrifuges at the Shahid Dr. Ali Mohammadi (Fordow) enrichment facility with advanced sixth-generation IR-6 models.

The IR-1 centrifuges are Iran’s oldest and least efficient, and Fordow has historically housed up to 2,784 IR-1 units across 16 cascades, although only a portion has been operational at any one time.

Under the 2015  deal, Iran was restricted to operating 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow, and only for non-enrichment purposes such as stable isotope production. However, following the unilateral and illegal US withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018, Iran resumed and expanded their use for enrichment.

Some IR-1 cascades — each producing about 0.75 to 1 separative work unit (SWU) per year — remain in operation but are gradually being phased out in favor of more advanced models. IR-6 centrifuges, introduced in the 2020s, are significantly more efficient, with SWU capacities estimated to be five to ten times greater than those of the IR-1.

Iran began installing IR-6 cascades at Fordow in 2021. By early 2023, two cascades — comprising roughly 348 machines — were operational and enriching uranium to 60%.

As of June 2024, plans were announced to install up to 1,400 IR-6 centrifuges in eight cascades, with some replacing IR-1 units. Recent statements following the IAEA resolution confirm ongoing installation of IR-6 cascades, with a goal to triple enrichment capacity.

Iran has also experimented with IR-2 and IR-4 centrifuges at other sites like Natanz, though their use at Fordow appears limited. The current focus has shifted to IR-6 — and potentially IR-9 — centrifuges due to their higher efficiency and alignment with Iran’s goal to accelerate uranium enrichment.

Production rates vary, but estimates suggest Fordow currently produces approximately 10 to 15 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium per month, based on IR-6 output of around 1 to 2 kilograms per cascade monthly.

For comparison, in 2013, prior to the JCPOA, Fordow produced 20 percent enriched uranium at a rate of 10.25 kilograms per month using 696 IR-1 centrifuges. If the planned 1,400 IR-6 centrifuges become fully operational, Fordow could potentially yield around 145 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium per month.

What can be expected at the UN Security Council?

The IAEA resolution aligns with a broader Western attempt to pressure Iran, leveraging IAEA claims to justify a potential sanctions snapback under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2231 (2015). The snapback mechanism is a critical component of the JCPOA, providing a process to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran if it violates the agreement, serving both as an enforcement tool and a point of contention.

It is enshrined in UNSC Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA. This provision allows any JCPOA participant (the P5+1 or Iran) to trigger the reinstatement of pre-JCPOA UN sanctions if Iran is deemed non-compliant with its nuclear commitments.

The trigger process begins when a participant notifies the UNSC of an issue regarding Iran’s compliance, supported by evidence. The matter is then debated for 30 days, during which the UN Security Council may vote to maintain sanctions relief.

If no resolution is adopted by at least nine of the 15 Security Council members, and without a veto from any of the five permanent members (P5), the sanctions automatically snap back.

This means that all UN sanctions lifted under the JCPOA, including arms embargoes and financial restrictions, are reinstated. The snapback reimposes measures from six previous UN Security Council resolutions (1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929).

The scope of these sanctions includes bans on Iran’s nuclear-related imports and exports, restrictions on ballistic missile technology, asset freezes on designated individuals and entities, and an arms embargo originally set to expire in October 2020 but extendable via snapback.

Although the snapback provision was initially set to expire on October 18, 2025 — ten years after the JCPOA’s adoption — its activation before that date remains possible in light of current developments.

After the Trump administration illegally withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed unilateral US sanctions, it attempted to trigger the snapback in August 2020, arguing that Iran’s post-2019 uranium enrichment breaches justified such action.

However, the attempt failed when the other P5+1 members — especially Russia and China — rejected the US’s authority to act, citing its withdrawal from the agreement. Although the UN Security Council did not adopt a resolution to maintain sanctions relief, the lack of consensus ultimately prevented a formal snapback.

Following the US withdrawal and subsequent hostile actions, Iran began reducing its JCPOA commitments starting in 2019, from around 3 percent in 2017 to 20 percent in 2021 and 60 percent in 2022. Tehran cited the US withdrawal and European inaction on sanctions relief as breaches of the deal and termed its measures reversible if other parties complied.

The current Trump administration has signaled readiness to pursue the snapback again, with West Asia envoy Steve Witkoff meeting Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer on June 12 to coordinate efforts.

France, Germany, and the UK have also suggested they might support a snapback.

However, Russia and China, both of whom voted against the latest IAEA resolution, are most likely to veto any snapback attempt, as it undermines diplomacy and reflects Western bias. This mirrors their stance in 2020 and is expected to prevent its enforcement.